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Stock Prices and Business Investment
s there a link between the stock market and 
business investment? Empirical evidence 
indicates that there is. A firm tends to invest 
more when its stock price increases, and it 
tends to invest less when the price falls. In this article, 
Yaron Leitner discusses existing research that explains 
this relationship. One question under consideration is 
whether the stock market actually improves investment 
decisions.
Empirical evidence points to a 
link between the stock market and the 
amount of money firms spend on in-
vestment. A firm tends to invest more 
after the price of its stock increases, 
and it tends to invest less after the 
price falls. Investment could be in capi-
tal (for example, buying machines or 
buying a new plant) or in research and 
development (for example, developing 
a new drug).
Recent research has tried to come 
up with theoretical explanations and 
test them empirically. One important 
issue is whether the stock market actu-
ally improves investment decisions. 
This might be the case, for example, 
if the firm’s stock price tells the firm 
something about the profitability of 
its investments — which might be 
the case if market participants have 
useful information or knowledge that 
the firm does not have. Interestingly, 
recent research has also suggested 
that while informed participants make 
prices more informative and therefore 
improve the firm’s investment deci-
sions, informed participants might also 
attempt to manipulate a firm’s invest-
ment policies.
THE STOCK MARKET 
CAN GUIDE INVESTMENT 
DECISIONS
Stock Prices Reflect Investors’ 
Information About the Firm. Inves-
tors hold stocks because they expect to 
obtain dividends and/or make capital 
gains. When investors expect future 
profits to be high, they pay more to 
hold the stock; when investors expect 
profits to be low, they pay less. Inves-
tors do not know what future profits 
will be, but they can collect pieces of 
information that may help them assess 
the firm’s value. For example, investors 
can look at the firm’s financial state-
ments as well as the financial state-
ments of other firms in the industry. 
They can collect information about 
the firm’s technology, the demand 
for its products, and its competitive 
environment. They can also look at 
other macroeconomic indicators; for 
example, a strong GDP report might 
strengthen investors’ beliefs that de-
mand for the firm’s products is going to 
be solid. Using these pieces of informa-
tion, each investor can come up with 
his own assessment of the firm’s value. 
The stock price reflects these assess-
ments. 
When new information arrives, 
prices adjust. For example, the stock 
price of a biotech firm will rise after 
it announces that it passed the initial 
tests for approval of a new drug, and 
the price is likely to fall if the firm gets 
involved in a lawsuit. Passing the ini-
tial tests means that the firm is likely 
to generate more profits, and there-
fore, investors are willing to pay more 
to hold the stock. In contrast, being 
involved in a lawsuit means that the 
firm is likely to generate less profits, 
and therefore, investors are willing to 
pay less.
Investors May Have Informa-
tion the Firm Does Not Have. Some 
of the information that investors have 
may be publicly available (for example, 
the firm’s financial statements). How-
ever, some investors may have informa-
tion no one else has. 
Consider the following example: 
A large hedge fund, Short-Term Man-
agement (STM), hires a group of ana-
lysts whose job is to help choose which Business Review  Q4  2007   13 www.philadelphiafed.org
stocks to buy. These analysts carefully 
study the demand for a firm’s products 
(for example, who will use a new drug) 
as well as the firm’s position relative to 
its competitors’. The firm can also hire 
its own analysts, but since the firm is 
not in the business of choosing stocks, 
the cost of having its own group of 
analysts may outweigh the benefits.
STM may have a better assess-
ment than the firm (as well as other 
investors) of the future demand for the 
firm’s products and the firm’s position 
relative to its competitors’. This assess-
ment is called private information.I n
other words, private information refers 
to the data that STM’s analysts gather 
as well as to their analysis of these 
data. The private information STM 
has allows it to evaluate the firm better 
than anyone else.1
How could STM use its private 
information to make a profit? Very 
simple: If STM thinks the firm’s stock 
is undervalued (that is, the firm’s pros-
pects are better than those reflected in 
the current price), it will buy the stock; 
if the stock is overvalued, STM will 
sell it. STM may not be correct all the 
time. After all, no one can fully predict 
the future. But STM may be correct on 
average; that is, the number of times it 
makes a correct decision (buy an un-
dervalued stock or sell an overvalued 
stock) will be higher than the number 
of times it makes mistakes. This will 
allow STM to make a profit even after 
paying its analysts’ wages.
To keep its information advan-
tage, STM will try to hide its infor-
mation. However, once STM trades, 
its information (or at least part of it) 
gradually becomes reflected in prices. 
STM’s buy orders (positive informa-
tion) will tend to push the price up, 
and its sell orders (negative informa-
tion) will push the price down.
In particular, suppose someone 
had to guess whether STM has positive 
information or negative informa-
tion by looking at aggregate buy and 
sell orders. Any order could come 
either from STM or from some other 
investors who do not have private 
information. The other investors buy 
and sell not because they have private 
information but for other reasons; for 
example, they need to rebalance their 
portfolio or buy a new house. Now 
suppose you see that there are many 
more buy orders than sell orders. A buy 
order increases the chance that STM 
has positive information; after all, 
STM buys only in this case. Similarly, 
a sell order increases the chance that 
STM has negative information. Thus, 
buy orders move the price up, and sell 
orders move the price down.2
The Information in Prices Can 
Help the Firm Make Investment 
Decisions. When some investors have 
better information than the firm, the 
firm can use the stock price as a guide 
in its investment decisions.
Consider the following example. 
Suppose a firm wants to expand its 
business overseas, which requires an 
upfront investment of $1 million. The 
firm does not know whether demand 
for its products will be high or low, but 
it knows that if the demand is high, 
the investment will yield a gross return 
of $6 million (that is, a profit of $5 
million), and if the demand is low, the 
investment will yield a gross return 
of zero (that is, a loss of $1 million). 
Should the firm make this investment? 
If the firm knew for sure that 
demand was going to be high, it would 
make the investment; if it knew for 
sure that demand was going to be low, 
it would not. However, the firm does 
not have that information. Suppose 
that the only thing the firm knows is 
that there is a 50-50 chance for high 
or low demand. This means that if the 
firm invests, on average, it would earn 
a profit of $2 million (½*5 - ½*1=2). 
Therefore, without further informa-
tion, the firm will make the invest-
ment — and this will be the right 
decision, given the information the 
firm had at the time it invested. 
Now go back to STM and its team 
of analysts. Once they learn that the 
firm is considering expanding its busi-
ness overseas (say, the firm announced 
it), they work day and night and even-
tually conclude that the investment is 
not likely to generate anything. They 
advise STM’s senior management to 
sell the stock, and when STM does so, 
the price goes down.
The firm does not have STM’s 
information, but when the firm sees 
that its price goes down, it may infer 
that STM does not think that the in-
vestment is likely to succeed. The firm 
can use this information and forgo 
the investment. Assuming that STM’s 
analysts are correct, the firm saves $1 
million.
1The fact that some investors (like STM) 
have better information than the firm in some 
respects does not mean that they have better 
information in all respects. For example, STM 
may know more about the demand for the firm’s 
products, but the firm may know more about 
the technology it uses. In other words, the firm 
may also have some private information.
2 There is an extensive literature that studies 
the way prices adjust to information. Two of the 
earlier theoretical contributions are the paper 
by Albert Kyle and the paper by Lawrence Glo-
sten and Paul Milgrom.
When some investors have better information 
than the firm, the firm can use the stock price 
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a firm’s investment is indeed more 
sensitive to its stock price when the 
price reflects more private information. 
A key to their analysis is determin-
ing when stock prices contain more 
private information. Chen, Goldstein, 
and Jiang use two measures and find 
that the implication holds for both. 
To learn more, see Measures of Private 
Information.
STOCK MARKET AFFECTS 
FIRM’S ABILITY TO FINANCE 
INVESTMENTS
In the previous section, we fo-
cused on a firm that was considering 
an investment opportunity (a business 
expansion). The problem was that the 
firm did not know whether the invest-
ment was profitable. In this section, 
we consider a similar situation but 
assume that the firm knows whether 
its investment is profitable. Now the 
problem is that the firm may find it 
too expensive to finance its investment 
because the stock price does not reflect 
the investment’s true prospects.
Stock Prices May Not Reflect 
the Firm’s True Value. A firm’s stock 
price reflects two things. The first is 
the firm’s (true) prospects, that is, the 
expected cash flows the firm is going 
to generate from its operations. The 
value of these cash flows in today’s 
terms is the firm’s fundamental value.
The second — called the nonfunda-
mental component — reflects factors 
that affect the price but that have 
nothing to do with the firm’s prospects. 
An example is investor sentiment (that 
is, the market mood): Low sentiment 
pushes prices down; high sentiment 
pushes prices up.4 In a world without 
The Value of Information. The 
fact that the firm can use the informa-
tion in stock prices increases its value. 
In the example above, the firm can 
avoid making a bad investment if it 
learns that demand is low. The firm 
will invest only if it learns that demand 
is high. This strategy gives an expected 
profit of $2.5 million (1/2*5+½*0 
=2.5). Remember, if the firm makes 
the investment without knowing what 
demand will be (that is, without look-
ing at the price), its expected profit 
is only $2 million. Therefore, STM’s 
trading activities increase the value of 
the firm by $1/2 million. The informa-
tion is valuable because it helps the 
firm make better investment decisions.
Empirical Evidence. If firms learn 
from stock prices, changes in stock 
prices are more likely to affect invest-
ment when the stock price contains 
more private information, that is, 
when prices are more likely to reflect 
the trading activities of investors like 
STM. The logic is simple: If investors 
like STM trade based on their private 
information, the firm can learn from 
prices, and price changes affect future 
investment decisions. On the other 
hand, if there are no investors like 
STM who trade based on private in-
formation, the firm cannot learn from 
prices, and price changes do not affect 
investment.3
Qi Chen, Itay Goldstein, and Wei 
Jiang provide empirical evidence that 
supports the view that firms learn from 
stock prices when they make their 
investment decisions. They show that 
frictions — for example, all investors 
have the same information and same 
assessments of the firm’s profitability 
— the stock price would equal the 
fundamental value because otherwise 
investors could make “free money” by 
buying undervalued stocks and selling 
overvalued stocks. But when there are 
frictions, as happens in reality, the 
stock price may sometimes deviate 
from its fundamental value.
When Prices Do Not Reflect 
Fundamentals, Equity Financing 
May Be Too Costly. Consider a firm 
with a profitable investment oppor-
tunity. How can the firm finance its 
investment? If the firm has a lot of 
cash, it can finance its new investment 
using internal funds. For example, if 
the firm keeps most of its profits rather 
than distributing them as dividends, 
the firm is likely to have enough cash 
to finance profitable investment oppor-
tunities that come its way. However, 
when the firm does not have enough 
cash at hand, it needs to raise money 
from an external source. It can do so 
either by borrowing (issuing debt) or 
selling more shares of stock (issuing 
equity). 
Issuing equity is sometimes the 
only option. In particular, lenders, who 
want to get their money back, may be 
willing to lend only to the point where 
the risk of default is not too high. In
addition, lenders often require collater-
al, and the firm may not have enough 
of it. Therefore, a firm that has already 
borrowed a lot (up to its limit) and that 
has no stockpile of cash can finance a 
new investment only if it issues equity. 
We will refer to such a firm as “eq-
uity dependent” because its ability to 
finance a new investment depends on 
its ability to issue a new equity.
Before making the investment, an 
equity-dependent firm must consider 
two things. First, it needs to con-
sider the “stand-alone” value of the 
investment, that is, the value of the 
3 There may be a relationship between price 
changes and investment even when the price 
contains no private information. For example, 
a strong GDP report may move up prices as well 
as investment. In this case, the firm does not 
need to rely on prices for its investment; it can 
look directly at the GDP report. But when the 
price contains private information, the relation-
ship between prices and investment is likely to 
be stronger.
4 In 1996, former Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan used the phrase “irrational 
exuberance” to describe the market mood at 
that time. This phrase was also the title of a 
2000 book by Yale economics professor Robert 
Shiller, who argued that the stock market had 
indeed become dangerously overvalued.Business Review  Q4  2007   15 www.philadelphiafed.org
Measures of Private Information
T
he finance literature has come up with 
two measures to assess the amount of 
private information in stock prices. Qi 
Chen, Itay Goldstein, and Wei Jiang 
showed that their results hold for both 
measures.
The first measure, developed by Richard Roll, is 
based on what economists call firm-specific variation. 
The idea is as follows. The price of a given stock often 
changes because of market-related and industry-related 
events. For example, release of a GDP report is likely to 
affect the prices of most stocks. But a stock’s price also 
moves because of events unique to the firm, for example, 
the firm’s plans to acquire a new plant. Roll’s measure 
calculates how much of the overall variation in the firm’s 
stock price is attributable to firm-specific rather than 
economy- or industry-wide factors. The measure is higher 
when the firm’s stock price is more likely to move because 
of firm-specific events, rather than economy-wide or 
industry-wide events.*
Focusing on firm-specific variation as a measure of 
trade based on private information makes sense because 
market- and industry-related price movements are likelier 
to reflect public information, that is, information available 
to all. Indeed, Roll showed that firm-specific variation is 
largely unassociated with public news releases and argued 
that firm-specific variation mainly reflects trading by 
investors with private information (for example, STM). 
Roll mentioned that there might be another explanation, 
namely, that firm-specific variation simply reflects noise, 
for example, factors unrelated to fundamentals. However, 
empirical evidence documented since then provides strong 
support to the hypothesis that firm-specific variation 
reflects more private information than noise. For example, 
Artyom Durnev, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, and 
Paul Zarowin showed that firm-specific variation is highly 
correlated with stock prices’ ability to predict firms’ future 
earnings.
The second measure, developed by David Easley, 
Nicholas Kiefer, and Maureen O’Hara, captures the 
probability that a trade will come from a trader who has 
private information. The measure is based on a model 
where some individuals have private information and some 
do not. The first group of traders is called informed and 
the second uninformed. Informed individuals trade only 
on days on which they receive private information (that 
is, they privately learn something about the firm). They 
trade in order to profit from their private information; 
they buy if they receive good news about the firm and sell 
if they receive bad news. The uninformed trade every day, 
and their trading activity does not reflect any information 
regarding the firm; for example, they buy and sell to 
rebalance their portfolios. 
To calculate the probability of a trade by an informed 
investor, we first need to fit the model to the data. In
particular, we can look at daily order flows over some 
period (say, a year) and then use statistical methods to 
estimate the probability that a given order comes from an 
informed trader.
 The estimated probability (of informed trading) 
is low when the number of buy and sell orders does not 
fluctuate much from one day to another. In contrast, when 
there are large fluctuations in order flows, the estimated 
probability of informed trading is high. Intuitively, if the 
number of uninformed investors is high (so the probability 
of informed trading is low), there is no reason to expect 
that all of them will decide to buy or that all of them will 
decide to sell on the same day. Instead, we can expect 
that the number of uninformed investors who decide to 
buy will be roughly the same on any given day and so will 
the number of investors who decide to sell. Therefore, 
we will not see large fluctuations in order flows, and the 
estimated probability of informed trading will indeed be 
low. In contrast, when there are large fluctuations in order 
flows, the estimated probability of informed trading is high 
because under the model above, large deviations from the 
“normal” order flow indicate that it is likely that trades 
are coming from investors who have received private 
information; for example, on a day on which informed 
investors receive good news about the firm, they will all 
buy, and the number of buy orders on that day will be 
larger than normal.
Finally, note that, in principle, the two measures 
above may reflect not only the trading activity of 
investors like STM but also the trading activity of the 
firm’s managers, who may also have superior information 
regarding some aspects of the firm. If this were the case, 
the measure above may capture information that the firm 
already knew, which is not consistent with the idea that 
the firm learns from prices. Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang 
validate their results by performing some tests that suggest 
that while the two measures may reflect some information 
the firm already knew, it also reflects information the firm 
did not know.
* To calculate this measure, one needs to run a regression where a firm’s return is explained by the return on the market and by the return on the indus-
try to which the firm belongs. The measure is estimated by 1-R2, where R2 is R-square from the regression. In other words, R2 is the share of variation in 
stock returns that can be explained by general (market) or industry-wide factors, and what’s left over (1-R2) measures private information.16   Q4  2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
investment if the firm had the cash to 
finance it. Second, given that the firm 
is equity dependent, it needs to take 
into account the cost of issuing equity. 
In particular, if the stock price equals 
the firm’s fundamental value, the 
firm knows that it is selling the stock 
for what it is worth. But if the firm 
believes that its stock is undervalued 
(its price is less than the fundamental 
value), the firm knows that it is losing 
money when it sells its stock. In other 
words, the firm receives less than what 
the stock is really worth. In this case, a 
firm may decide to forgo some invest-
ments, even though the firm would 
make the investments if it had its own 
money. In other words, an equity-de-
pendent firm may decide to forgo its 
investment because the cost of issuing 
new shares is too high compared with 
the revenues the firm expects to obtain 
from the new investment.5
Empirical Evidence. The discus-
sion above implies that the investment 
of equity-dependent firms will be 
more sensitive to the nonfundamental 
component in stock prices than the 
investment of firms that are less equity 
dependent. In particular, an equity-
dependent firm will tend to invest 
less when its stock price is below the 
fundamental value, that is, when the 
nonfundamental component is nega-
tive. This occurs not because invest-
ment opportunities change but because 
an undervalued stock increases the 
cost of obtaining the money the firm 
needs for its investment.
Malcolm Baker, Jeremy Stein, 
and Jeffrey Wurgler found empirical 
evidence consistent with the implica-
tion above. A challenging issue in 
their analysis was how to measure the 
nonfundamental component in stock 
prices. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler 
tried to tackle this issue by looking at 
the actual return on the stock in the 
long term; specifically, they looked at 
returns over the three years subsequent 
to the investment. Their idea is that 
the firm expected these returns when 
it considered its investment and that 
the firm used these returns to deter-
mine whether its stock was under- or 
overvalued. Of course, the firm did not 
and could not know for sure how fu-
ture returns would turn out. However, 
using future returns as a proxy for the 
firm’s expected returns is a way for the 
authors (and us) to have a reasonable 
estimate of what the firm might have 
had in mind. Using this logic they find 
that the investment of equity-depen-
dent firms is indeed more sensitive to 
the nonfundamental component in 
stock prices than the investment of 
firms that are less equity dependent.6
Lenders Also Look at Stock 
Prices. Stock prices may also affect 
the cost of borrowing. In particular, 
potential lenders (banks) can learn 
from stock prices just as the firm in 
the previous section did. Banks can 
then use the information in stock 
prices to evaluate a loan.7  When stock 
prices reflect fundamentals, there is no 
problem: Banks have correct informa-
tion about the firm, and a firm with a 
profitable investment opportunity can 
raise money because the stock price 
reflects that. But if the price does not 
reflect fundamentals, a firm with a 
good investment opportunity may need 
to forgo it. In particular, when banks 
see that the stock price is low, they 
may wrongly conclude that the firm’s 
prospects are not so good, and there-
fore, they may be unwilling to lend, or 
they may agree to lend only at a very 
high interest rate.8
TRADERS CAN MANIPULATE 
INVESTMENT DECISIONS
We have seen that the stock 
market may affect investment decisions 
because it provides information both 
to the firm that makes the investment 
and to those who provide the money 
for the investment. Itay Goldstein 
and Alexander Guembel developed 
a model to show that while this may 
improve investment decisions, it may 
also open the door for manipulation. 
Let’s go back to the example 
where a firm was considering an 
investment opportunity ($1 million 
payment upfront, which results in ei-
ther a $5 million profit or a $1 million 
loss). Suppose the firm does not know 
whether the investment will succeed or 
fail, but STM does. As we saw earlier, 
STM can use its private information to 
5 Issuing equity may raise another problem: If
the firm knows more than its investors, inves-
tors may fear that the firm is selling equity not 
because it needs to finance a profitable invest-
ment but because the firm thinks that its stock 
is overvalued. Therefore, once the firm decides 
to sell more shares, investors may pay even less 
than what the initial price was. According to 
the pecking order theory, the firm will issue 
equity only as a last resort. In particular, a firm 
that needs to raise money will do it in the fol-
lowing order: First, the firm will use its internal 
funds, then it will borrow; only after it has bor-
rowed as much as it can will it issue equity. To 
learn more about the pecking order theory, read 
the paper by Stewart Myers.
6 To determine how equity dependent a firm is, 
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler construct an index. 
According to the index, a firm is more equity 
dependent if it has borrowed a lot; it is less 
equity dependent if it has higher operating cash 
flows or higher cash balances or if it pays higher 
dividends.
7 Indeed, widely used measures of default risk 
(for example, Altman’s Z-Score) include the 
firm’s stock price. The Z-score was developed 
in 1968 by Edward Altman for forecasting the 
probability that a company will enter bankrupt-
cy within a two-year period. The Z-score com-
bines five common business ratios, one of which 
is the ratio between the market value of equity 
and the book value of debt. (The market value 
of equity is the stock price times the number of 
shares outstanding.)  Banks and industrial com-
panies regularly use updated and refined propri-
etary versions of Altman’s Z-score model. 
8In this section we focused on the case where 
prices that do not reflect fundamentals make it 
hard for a firm to finance its project. Prices that 
do not reflect fundamentals would also make it 
hard for the firm in the previous section to learn 
from prices.Business Review  Q4  2007   17 www.philadelphiafed.org
make a profit by buying undervalued 
stock and selling overvalued stock. If
STM does so, the stock price reflects 
STM’s private information and can 
help the firm make better investment 
decisions. In particular, a price decline 
indicates to the firm that STM thinks 
the investment is a failure, and the 
firm can save money by not investing.
Goldstein and Guembel show that 
an investor like STM may choose to 
trade even if it has no information at 
all.9 In this case, the only purpose of 
STM’s trade is to manipulate the firm’s 
investment decisions and make money 
out of it. In particular, they assume 
that sometimes STM has private infor-
mation about the firm and sometimes 
it does not. They show that STM may 
choose to trade not only in the first 
case but also in the second case. 
Manipulation Is Possible 
Through Short Sales. When STM 
has no information, it can make a 
profit by short selling the stock. Short 
selling means that an investor (in our 
case, STM) borrows the stock from 
someone else and sells it. Then, at a 
later date, the investor buys the stock 
and returns it to whomever he bor-
rowed it from. In other words, a short 
seller sells a stock that he does not 
own. Short selling might be a good 
strategy if one expects prices to fall. 
In this case, the short seller can make 
a profit by buying the stock at a lower 
price than the price at which he sold 
the stock. 
But why should STM expect to 
be able to buy the stock at a lower 
price? The main idea is as follows: By
selling the stock, STM drives down 
the price. The firm infers that the 
lower price may indicate that STM 
thinks the firm’s investment is likely 
to fail. Therefore, the firm does not 
invest. This by itself reduces the value 
of the firm and the price of the stock 
even further, thereby allowing STM 
to buy the stock at a lower price than 
it initially sold it for. In other words, 
initially, investors thought the firm 
had an investment expected to yield 
a profit of $2.5 million, so they were 
willing to pay more to hold the stock. 
Once they learn the firm is not mak-
ing the investment, they are willing to 
pay less and the price of the stock falls. 
You might ask: What’s so special 
about STM? Why can’t anyone follow 
the same strategy and make a profit? 
The logic is as follows: For the aver-
age investor, who never has private 
information, short selling is a recipe 
for losing money because the aver-
age investor competes with investors, 
like STM, who are likely to be better 
informed. Since the more informed in-
vestors make money, the less informed 
lose. Remember, there must be an 
investor on the other side of each of 
STM’s trades. However, for an investor 
like STM, short selling can be a win-
ning strategy even when it has no private 
information about the stock. The reason 
is that only STM knows whether it 
does or does not have information 
— and this by itself is a very important 
piece of information. In other words, 
STM has an information advantage 
not only when it has private informa-
tion about the firm but also when it 
does not. In the first case, it knows 
whether the investment will succeed 
or fail. In the second case, it does not 
know that, but it knows that no one 
else knows. In contrast, the average 
investor, who never obtains private 
information, always needs to take into 
account the possibility that he or she is 
trading with another investor (STM) 
with better information.
To summarize, by short selling, 
an investor can manipulate the stock 
price and the firm’s investment deci-
sions. Indeed, many firms complain 
about short sales, arguing that they 
may be manipulative and therefore 
costly to shareholders. For example, in 
a letter to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Medizone Interna-
tional Inc. claims that “short-selling…
and other actions that have served to 
limit our access to capital, diminished 
or suppressed the value of our shares…
This short selling has proven extremely 
detrimental to our company and our 
shareholders.”10
One of the interesting features of 
the model above is that manipulation 
is profitable only through short sales. 
In particular, STM can profit by selling 
the stock initially and buying it later, 
but STM cannot profit from doing 
the opposite, that is, buying first and 
selling later. The reason is that if STM 
trades when it has no information, 
the trades distort prices as well as the 
firm’s investment decisions. In par-
ticular, STM’s selling the stock leads 
to a price decline and an inefficient 
decrease in investment; STM’s buying 
the stock drives the price up, leading 
to an inefficient rise in investment. In
both cases, the firm makes a wrong 
investment decision, and the stock 
price falls at a later time to reflect that. 
In other words, regardless of whether 
STM manipulates by buying or selling, 
the price eventually drops. This means 
that STM can profit only if it sells 
initially.
Finally, note that even though 
manipulation distorts investment 
9 Goldstein and Guembel use the word specula-
tor to refer to an investor like STM, which may 
or may not have private information. 
10 This example is provided by Goldstein and 
Guembel. The letter can be found at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72499/marshal2.txt.
Regulatory bodies (for example, the SEC in the 
United States) have introduced restrictions such 
as the “up-tick” rule on short sales. According 
to the up-tick rule, established by the SEC, 
every short-sale transaction must be entered at a 
price that is higher than the price of the previ-
ous trade. The up-tick rule prevents short sellers 
from adding to the downward momentum when 
the price of an asset is already experiencing 
sharp declines.18   Q4  2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
decisions, which is bad for the firm, 
overall, the stock market produces 
better decisions, which is good for the 
firm. Otherwise, the firm would have 
ignored the information in the stock 
price. In other words, if the firm (or 
other investors) knew that the stock 
market reflects wrong information too 
often, they would have ignored it when 
they made their decisions. However, 
if the price usually reflects correct 
information and only seldom reflects 
incorrect information (which is the 
case if STM is likely to have private in-
formation), the firm as well as investors 
would consider the price when they 
make their decisions. 
CONCLUSION
Stock prices may affect invest-
ment decisions because they provide 
information to firms about the profit-
ability of their investment opportuni-
ties. Stock prices may also affect firms’ 
ability to finance new investments. In
particular, when prices do not reflect 
fundamentals, a firm with a profitable 
investment opportunity may need to 
forgo it.
We have also seen that while 
short selling may make stock prices 
more informative about the firm’s 
prospects and therefore may improve 
the firm’s investment decisions, the 
ability to short sell may also open the 
door to manipulation. In particular, by 
short selling a stock, an investor with 
no information may cause a firm to 
believe that its investment is likely to 
fail. This may cause the firm to forgo 
some profitable investment opportuni-
ties. The SEC administers regulations 
concerning short sales. For example, 
the SEC does not permit short sales 
when a stock price is falling. Much of 
the discussion about regulation of short 
sales centers on the tradeoff between 
making stock prices more informative 
and the danger of manipulation. The 
work discussed in this article can help 
clarify the terms of this tradeoff.
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